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Commercial real estate is routinely cited as the primary culprit in
the recent banking crisis. In metropolitan areas throughout the country,
office vacancy rates commonly approach 20 percent or more. Rents have
softened and property values have fallen, in some cases precipitously.
And while such problems seem most severe for office space, values of
retail and warehouse properties have also fallen.1 Not only have banks
failed because of losses on real estate loans, but they have also
introduced more stringent credit standards in response to these difficul-
ties, standards that are believed to have offset interest rate reductions
and sapped the strength of the recovery.
This paper examines how the glut of commercial real estate space
developed and how banks came to be so severely damaged. It concludes
that commercial real estate construction, especially construction of office
buildings, is inherently cyclical. However, the cycle of the 1980s was
magnified by tax and institutional changes and by a conviction--shared
by developers, banks, the academic community, and the general pub-
licmthat real estate was a high-return, low-risk investment.
The paper also argues that the consequences of declining real estate
values fell so l~eavily on banks, first, because they had moved very
aggressively into real estate lending in the 1980s, and second, because
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these loans were obligations of borrowers whose only assets were real
estate. When real estate values fell, instead of deep-pocketed corporate
borrowers to share the losses, there remained only individuals and
partnerships whose net worth melted away.
The first section of the paper examines patterns of commercial real
estate construction over time and across regions. Following very low
levels of commercial construction in the late 1970s, construction activity,
especially in office buildings, soared in the mid 1980s, plateaued, and
then plummeted at the end of the decade. Patterns varied considerably
among regions, with New England an exaggerated example of the
national picture. The second section reviews various explanations for
the commercial construction boom of the 1980s, focusing on the strong
growth in the financial and services sectors, tax code changes, the effect
of deregulation on the availability of capital, and expectations of real
estate appreciation.
The following section uses regression analysis of building patterns
in the nine census regions to evaluate these explanations. It finds that
the commercial construction boom was driven by a combination of eco-
nomic fundamentals, tax changes, and lender enthusiasm for real estate.
Based on this analysis, the paper then discusses the inherently
cyclical nature of commercial construction. Boston is used to illustrate
the sensitivity of commercial real estate values to changes in occupancy
and rental rates and to demonstrate why banks were so vulnerable
when real estate values declined. Conclusions follow.
Commercial Construction Patterns
An excess of commercial building space could arise because of too
much building or because of an unexpected falloff in the demand for
space. The latter certainly played a role in the real estate difficulties of
Texas and other Southwestern states, where declining oil prices pro-
duced a dramatic reversal of economic fortunes in the mid 1980s. But
while unanticipated declines in demand may have contributed to the
present nationwide commercial real estate glut, much of the blame lies
with overbuilding.
As can be seen in Figure 1, construction of commercial buildings
ballooned in the first half of the 1980s. In just the two years between
1983 and 1985, the constant dollar value of commercial construction
increased 50 percent. As a consequence, about 14 percent of total
nonresidential investment was devoted to commercial construction in
the mid 1980s, compared to 8 percent in the second half of the 1970s and
12 percent in the early 1970s.
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cial buildings all contributed to the increase.2 However, the increase was
more pronounced for offices than for other commercial buildings; the
timing was also a little different. In contrast to the commercial sector,
construction of industrial or manufacturing buildings was subdued
through the 1980s.
While most parts of the country saw increases in commercial
construction in the 1980s, the differences were striking. Figure 2 shows
the shares of U.S. commercial construction in the nine census regions.
The construction boom was particularly pronounced along the East
Coast; New England, the Mid Atlantic, and South Atlantic regions all
accounted for higher shares of the nation’s commercial construction in
the 1980s than they had in the second half of the 1970s. In the West
South Central states, in contrast, commercial construction soared at the
start of the 1980s, but then fell precipitously in the second half of the
decade.
2 The three major categories of commercial construction are office, hotels and motels,
and "other commercial." The last consists of "buildings and structures which are intended
for use by wholesale, retail, or service trade establishments." Shopping malls, stores,
restaurants, auto service stations, and warehouses and storage facilities that are not part
of industrial facilities are all considered "other commercial" buildings. Not included are
educational and religious buildings and hospitals. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Current Construction Reports C30--9105, Value of New Construction Put in Place.60 Lynn E. Browne and Karl E. Case
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Causes of the Boom
Some increase in commercial construction in the 1980s was un-
doubtedly justified by economic fundamentals. Office vacancy rates atHOW THE COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE BOOM UNDID THE BANKS 61
Table 1
Changes in U.S. Employment in 1970s and 1980s, Selected Industries
Percent
Industry                      1969-74 1974-79 1979-84 1984-89
Total Employment 10.1 13.3 7.0 13.3
Commercial Tenant Industries:
Wholesale and Retail Trade 14.0 17.6 8.6 15.2
Finance, Insurance, and
Real Estate 25.1 23.9 18.3 17.2
Services 18.6 22.0 22.7 25.0
Other 4.6 7.4 -1.5 5.8
Note: The calculations in Table 1 are based on U.S. data, which are, in effect, a weighted average of the
states. Calculations in Table 2 are based on the average of the 50 states (simple mean).
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional information System,
computer tape and authors’ calculations.
the start of the decade were low, presumably the result of the relatively
low rates of construction in the second half of the 1970s, coupled with
strong growth in industries that occupy office space. Regional variations
in construction patterns also suggest a tie to underlying economic
conditions. In particular, the timing of the construction boom and bust
in the West South Central states reflects the rise and fall in oil prices.
While economic fundamentals had some role, however, the Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981 and financial deregulation are
thought to have boosted construction beyond what could be supported
by the underlying demand for commercial space. The effects of ERTA
were magnified by new investment vehicles that brought more owners
into the market to take advantage of tax benefits; not only did this
encourage more building, but it also had implications for the incidence
of the losses that eventually resulted. In addition, the rise in real estate
values in the 1970s appears to have resulted in a widespread perception
that real estate was a low-risk, high-return investment, thus creating a
climate conducive to overbuilding.
Demand Fundamentals
While Figure 1 shows a surge in commercial building in the mid
1980s, it also shows unusually low rates of construction in the late 1970s.
Employment growth in the late 1970s, in contrast, was robust. As can be
seen from Table 1, employment growth was especially strong in those
sectors that occupy commercial space: finance, insurance, and real
estate; services; and wholesale and retail trade. As a result, the 1980s
started with a substantial pent-up demand for commercial space. In the
office market, vacancy rates in downtown areas averaged only 4 percent62 Lynn E. Browne and Karl E. Case
Table 2
Variation in State Employment Growth in the 1970s and 1980s
Percent Change












in 1980. In some markets, such as Denver, Los Angeles, and San
Francisco, vacancy rates were less than 1 percent.3
The recessions of 1980 and 1981-82 sent overall employment plum-
meting. However, the impact of the recessions was very uneven.
Manufacturing bore the brunt. Services and finance, insurance, and real
estate held up relatively well in the recessions and then grew strongly as
the recovery took hold. Thus, the industries that occupy commercial
space fared much better in the early 1980s than the overall economy.
If space were completely fungible, these sectoral differences would
be irrelevant. But despite the rather nondescript~nature of many modern
manufacturing buildings and office complexes, facilities suitable to
manufacturers are not ideally situated or designed for the needs of the
financial or services industries. Accordingly, surplus space in declining
industries was of limited value to those that were expanding.
In a similar vein, the uneven pattern of regional growth in the early
1980s may have contributed to a higher level of construction nationwide.
Even given the modest rate of U.S. growth, the variation among states
was greater from 1979 to 1984 than it had been in the 1970s (Table 2).
Buildings are not mobile, and a surplus of space in one area does
nothing to relieve the demand for space elsewhere. Therefore, even
when employment growth at the national level is slow, pressure to build
in some states and localities may be quite strong.
Changes in the Tax Code
While a pickup in commercial construction may have been justified
by underlying demand, it received added impetus from the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA). A major goal of ERTA was to
3 Vacancy rates averaged 10 percent over the 1970s; they were low at the start of the
decade, high in the middle, and low at the end. Source: CB Commercial!Torto Wheaton
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stimulate investment. High rates of inflation in the late 1970s had
reduced the value of depreciation deductions, thereby increasing the
cost of capital. ERTA attempted to offset this by reducing asset lives and
permitting more accelerated depreciation schedules. Building lives were
shortened from about 40 years to 15 years.4
ERTA also expanded the investment tax credit for equipment and
preserved the 60 percent capital gains exclusion for individuals. The
effect of the capital gains exclusion was somewhat offset, however, by
cuts in personal income tax rates. In particular, the top individual rate
was reduced from 70 percent to 50 percent.
Although ERTA was originally thought to be biased towards
investment in equipment, primarily because the investment tax credit
did not apply to structures, over time it became apparent that ERTA
actually favored real estate over other forms of investment,s Bosworth
(1985) pointed out that commercial buildings were more amenable to
debt financing than most investments and that the greater use of debt
conferred additional tax advantages. Hines (1987) focused on the tax
shelter opportunities ERTA created for high-income individuals. Com-
mercial properties offered particularly attractive opportunities to shelter
income, as they could be financed largely by debt, depreciated at
accelerated rates, and then sold for a capital gain to others who hoped
to repeat the process. The fact that properties could be resold and
depreciated several times ("churned") increased the impact of ERTA’s
depreciation provisions on the incentive to invest in real estate.6
Internal Revenue Service data show a sharp rise in limited partner-
ship investment in real property following ERTA (Hines 1987). And a
survey of the downtown Boston office market in the mid 1980s high-
lights the importance of the individual investor to the commercial real
estate market: "about 85 percent of the office buildings" were owned by
individuals and partnerships (McClure 1986). The pattern of commercial
mortgage obligations, discussed in the next section, provides further
confirmation of the importance of noncorporate investors in the real
estate market.
The boom in real estate tax shelters led Congress to scale back the
depreciation rules allowed for real estate in 1984. Then, the Tax Reform
4 ERTA introduced the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) that replaced the
former Asset Depreciation Range tables with a simple system that classified all property
into one of four categories according to asset life: 3-, 5-, 10-, and 15-year property.
5 For examples of early analysis see Gravelle (1982 and 1983), Auerbach (1983) and
Fullerton and Henderson (1984).
6 In addition, Summers (1987) argued that a very low real discount rate should be used
in calculating the present value of depreciation deductions because the pattern is known
with virtual certainty once the asset is put in place. A low discount rate sharply increases
the present value of future tax benefits. However, Summers also found that businesses do
not actually apply a lower discount rate to tax benefits than to riskier income streams when
making investment decisions.64 Lynn E. Browne and Karl E. Case
Table 3
Present Value of Depreciation Provisions per $1000 of Building Value
Based on 9 Percent Discount Rate
Pre-ERTA 1982-84 1984-86 Post-1986
No Churning        $ 75.20 $105.80 $ 88.20 $12.60
Churning $138.80 $195.30 $162.20 $23.30
Note: No churning assumes that the building is depreciated for six years using the optimal method and
asset life, and then is sold in the seventh year. Churning assumes that the building is depreciated for six
years and sold in the seventh year, then depreciated again and sold in years 14 and 21.
Source: Calculations described in detail in Appendix A.
Act of 1986 wiped out virtually all tax provisions favorable to commercial
real estate investment by individuals. Depreciation schedules for struc-
tures were lengthened. The top marginal tax rate for individuals was cut
from 50 percent to 28 percent. The 60 percent exclusion for long-term
capital gains was eliminated, as was the ability to shelter ordinary
income from taxation by using "passive" losses on real estate invest-
ments.7
Appendix A and Appendix Table A-1 describe in detail how
changes in marginal rates, depreciation rules, and the capital gains
exclusion changed the attractiveness of real estate investment for
high-income individuals during four periods: pre-ERTA, from 1982 to
1984, from 1984 to 1986, and post-1986. The results are summarized in
Table 3. It seems clear that ERTA should have been a powerful stimulus
to individual real estate investment and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 an
even more powerful depressant.
The opportunities created by ERTA for individuals to deduct
passive real estate losses from ordinary income led syndicators to devise
still other ways to use the tax code to the advantage of real estate
investments. A number of private placement memoranda for limited
partnerships investing in office buildings were analyzed for this paper.
While no two deals were the same, they shared some characteristics.
Key provisions are illustrated in the box that follows, which presents a
simplified typical tax shelter based on a conservative syndication done
on an actual office building in 1984.
All the deals examined took full advantage of the depreciation rules
and capital gains provisions discussed above. All were able to secure
virtually 100 percent debt financing. The new office buildings were
7 Passive losses are losses incurred on investments in which the investor does not
"materially participate" in the management of the project. Most real estate investments are
considered passive. Costs associated with passive investments can only be charged against
income from passive investments. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, real estate losses
could be set against "active" ordinary income.HOW THE COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE BOOM UNDID THE BANKS 65
Hypothetical Shelter
OFFICE BUILDING: Class A 800,000 sq. ft. 1984
TOTAL PROJECT COST: $120 million ($150 per sq. ft.)
Building $90 million; land $30 million
FINANCING ASSUMPTIONS: $100 million first mortgage (insurance company),
14.4 percent interest. Balloon payable in eight years. Interest only.
$20 million second mortgage from general partner at 16 percent interest accrued
plus $1.6 million annually in fees accrued,
Annual cash interest: $14.4 million on first mortgage.
Annual accrued interest and fees: $4,8 million.
Building and land sold at the end of year 8 for $120 million.
LIMITED PARTNERS: 200 shares sold at $140,000 each (private offering). $20,000
payable up front plus $15,000 annually for eight years.
CAPITAL COST RECOVERY: 15-year straight line; no recapture.
ANNUAL INCOME AND EXPENSES (Years 1-8):
Gross Rent ($30/sq. ft. no vacancy) $ 24.0 million
- Taxes and operating expenses ($10/sq, ft,) -8.0 million
Net effective rent $16.0 million
- Cash debt service -14.4 million
Net cash flow $ 1,6 million
- Accrued interest and fees
- Depreciation (15-year SL/Bldg. only)
-4.8 million
-6.0 million
Net partnership income/loss $-9.2 million
Limited Partner Gains and Costs ($000)
Year 0 1    2    3 4 5    6    7 8    8
Cash due -20 -15 -15 -15 -15 -15 -15 -15 -15
Share of loss (46) (46) (46)(46) (46) (46)(46) (46)
Tax saving 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Capital gains tax -48
Partner cash flow -20 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 -48
Assumes: marginal tax rate 50%; share of capital gains tax calculated from de-
preciated book value of building = $42 million.
Gain = ($48 million/200) x .4 included x .50 marginal tax rate = $48,000
General Partner/Syndicator Cash Flow
($ millions)
Year    0    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 8
Construction and land -120.0
Loan proceeds 100.0
Building net cash flow 1.6 1.6 1.6 1,6 1.6 1.6 1,6 1.6
From partners 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Sale proceeds 120
Pay loan - 100





aReturns to partners are those at which discounted net cash flow equals 0.66 Lynn E. Browne and Karl E. Case
financed with first and second mortgages, as well as direct loans and
working capital loans from the general partner or development com-
pany to the limited partners. These loans from the general partner
frequently carried high rates of interest that accrued until the building
was sold. The accrued interest was, in essence, a way of transferring
part of the ultimate gain upon sale to the developer/syndicator, while
allowing the limited partners to deduct interest costs before they were
actually paid.
Without appreciation in the value of the buildings, the rates of
return to limited partners implied by the syndicates’ pricing policies
were good but not extraordinary. Since they were highly leveraged,
however, limited partners earned extraordinary returns if building
values were rising. But leverage is extremely dangerous when asset
values fall. With a 10 percent down payment, a 10 percent decline in
value eliminates a partnership’s equity; and as will be shown in a later
section, real estate values are very sensitive to changes in assumptions
about vacancy rates and rent levels.
Credit Availability
The financial deregulation of the early 1980s is also thought to have
fueled investment in commercial real estate, by making financing more
available. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Con-
trol Act of 1980 began a phase-out of interest ceilings on deposits of
banks and thrift institutions and broadened the lending powers of
federally chartered thrifts. But while the ability to offer higher interest
rates enabled banks and thrifts to compete more effectively for deposits
with money market funds and other financial intermediaries, it also
increased the cost of funds and created pressure to generate higher rates
of return on their investments. To pay more they had to earn more.
Thrifts have been castigated for using the expanded powers given
them by both federal and state authorities to plunge into high-risk areas
with which they. were unfamiliar. Whatever the thrifts’ failings, com-
mercial banks, not thrifts, were the major suppliers of funds for
commercial construction.8 As can be seen from Tab.le 4, commercial
banks’ share of all commercial mortgages outstanding rose from just
over 30 percent in 1980 to almost 45 percent by the end of the decade,
8 Thrifts may have contributed to the commercial real estate boom indirectly. To the
extent that they competed aggressively for funds by offering higher rates, they would have
forced banks to do the same and increased the pressure on bank earnings.HOW THE COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE BOOM UNDID THE BANKS 67
Table 4
Commercial Mortgages as Assets
A, Share of Commercial Mortgages Outstanding Held by Major Lenders
Percent
1980 1984 1988 1990
31,6 36.6 43.7 44.5
24.1 24.8 19.8 14.4
31.6 26.6 26.4 28.4





B, Major Lenders’ Concentrations in Commercial Mortgages
Percent
1980 1984 1988 1990
Commercial Banks
Commercial Mortgages/Total Assets 5.4 7.2 10.3 10,1
Commercial Mortgages/Total Mortgages 30.8 40.2 45.4 39,5
Thrifts
Commercial Mortgages/Total Assets 7,2 8,0 7.5 6.9
Commercial Mortgages/Total Mortgages 10.3 14,4 14,4 12.5
Life Insurance Companies
Commercial Mortgages/Total Assets 17.4 15.9 16,3 15.7
Commercial Mortgages/Total Mortgages 61.6 71.0 79.1 80.3
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts, Financial Assets
and Liabilities 2.1, March 12, 1992 and Balance Sheets for the U.S, Economy 1960-91, March 1992.
and their concentration in commercial mortgages rose from 5 percent of
total assets to more than 10 percent.9
The nature of commercial mortgage borrowers contributed to the
difficulties that banks subsequently experienced. Roughly 70 percent of
commercial mortgages are obligations of partnerships and other non-
corporate businesses (Table 5). Corporations and nonprofit organiza-
tions, such as churches, hospitals, and universities, make up the balance.
The dominant role played by noncorporate businesses is significant
in several respects. First, much of the noncorporate sector is in the
business of real estate. Some 80 percent of noncorporate assets are in
real estate.~° While banks are usually thought to lend against a busi-
ness’s general prospects, in the case of commercial mortgages they were
lending against the value of the asset. Had commercial mortgages been
9 Commercial mortgages in the Flow of Funds Accounts include all nonfarm nonres-
idential mortgages.
10 Since some noncorporate businesses have nothing to do with real estate, the share
of total assets in real estate would be even higher for those in this industry.68 Lynn E. Browne and Karl E. Case
Table 5
Commercial Mortgages as Liabilities
A. Share of Outstanding Commercial Mortgages Owed by Major Borrowers
Percent
1980 1984 1988 1990
Nonfarm Noncorporate Businesses 71.4 84.5 72,4 69,9
Nonfinancial Corporations 15.8 5.2 11.7 12.0
Households. Trusts, and Nonprofit
Organizations 12,3 9,9 15,6 17.7
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS) .5 .4 .3 .4
B. Extent of Noncorporate and Corporate Commercial Mortgage Liabilities
Percent




All Mortgages/All Rea! Estate
Real Estate/Total Assets
Mortgages and Bank Loans/
Total Liabilities
Total Liabilities/Total Assets
54.8 68.5 66.7 62.4
23,6 31,7 35,7 33,9
80.1 78.5 78.1 78.2
70,9 70,9 70,6 68.7
33.6 40.9 44.6 44.1
Nonfinancial Corporations
Commercial Mortgages/
Nonresidential Real Estatea 2.6 1.0 3,2 3,5
All Mortgages/All Real Estate 5.3 2.5 4.4 4,6
Real Estate/Total Assets 36.0 37.2 36.2 34.4
Mortgages and Bank Loans/
Total Liabilities 23.7 22.9 21.3 20.1
Total Liabilities/Total Assets 29.7 33.8 41.3 44.0
Note: Assets include financial assets and the current cost of tangible assets.
aNonresidential real estate was estimated by allocating land in proportion to the values of residential and
nonresidential structures.
Source: See Table 4.
obligations of the corporate sector, other resources would have been
available to tap when real estate values fell. Most of the corporate sector
derives its earnings from other, unrelated activities; real estate is only a
means to an end. For much of the noncorporate sector, real estate is the
end.~l
~1 In this regard, commercial mortgages are fundamentally different from residential
mortgages. Residential mortgages are generally approved based on the homeowner’s
income from activities unrelated to the value of the property. The property is a backup,
something to draw upon if the ability to service the loan is unexpectedly interrupted.
However, for most commercial mortgages, the ability to pay is inextricably tied to theHOW THE COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE BOOM UNDID THE BANKS
In addition, noncorporate businesses can be structured in very
complex ways and they are not subject to the financial disclosure
requirements imposed on public corporations. Banks should hold bor-
rowers to stricter information standards than the general requirements
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, but they may not always
have done so. The limited partnership agreements reviewed for this
paper were dauntingly complicated. Thus, a lack of readily comprehen-
sible financial information on commercial mortgage borrowers may have
obscured potential problems.
Banks’ shift into commercial real estate is frequently attributed to
their unfavorable experience in other lending areas. The early 1980s saw
first loans to less developed nations and then energy loans sour. At the
same time, banks were encountering competition in lending to their
traditional large corporate customers from the commercial paper mar-
ket, finance companies, and foreign sources. But the movement into
commercial real estate was not simply a retreat from other areas. Real
estate investments were seen as offering very attractive returns by
academics and the general public, as well as by banks.
The Appeal of Real Estate
In the late 1970s and early 1980s a number of articles appeared in
scholarly journals comparing returns generated by real estate with those
from common stocks, bonds, and government securities. The findings
were generally quite favorable to real estate. As one survey of the
literature noted, "More than half the studies find that absolute returns
on real estate have been higher than returns on either stocks, bonds, or
other assets" and "most of the studies indicate that real estate earned a
higher return per unit of risk than common stocks and the other assets
included in the studies" (Sirmans and Sirmans 1987, p. 22).
These results were qualified by acknowledgement that the measure-
ment of the returns to real estate involved many assumptions. A lack of
data on prices and earnings plagues research on nonresidential real
estate. With hindsight, it seems that the approximations used in many
of these studies understated the risks associated with real estate.12 At
value of the collateral. If the ability to pay suffers because vacancy rates increase and rents
decline, the value of the collateral also falls. Reinforcing this lack of diversification is the
fact that real estate owners’ properties are likely to be regionally, or even locally,
concentrated. Thus, if a weakening economy causes problems for one, it is likely to mean
problems for all. Moreover, while lenders may require borrowers to provide personal
guarantees, a borrower who owns a few large properties may appear to have great
personal wealth while remaining vulnerable to problems at just one or two projects.
ta In a number of cases, returns were calculated using appraised values rather than
actual transactions. This approach has been criticized for smoothing out returns on the
grounds that appraisals are based on long-run values rather than short-run market70 Lynn E. Browne and Karl E. Case
Figure 3
Change in the Value of Nonresidential
Real Estate in the United States
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the time, however, the overall message was that real estate compared
favorably with other forms of investment.
It seems probable that ownership of nonresidential real estate did
indeed generate attractive returns in the 1970s. Construction costs rose
rapidly, surpassing the rate of inflation in a number of years. This
increase in the cost of new buildings should have pushed up the values
of existing structures that were close substitutes. And for building
owners who had financed their property in times of lower inflation and
lower interest rates, this appreciation would have resulted in real as well
as nominal increases in the value of their equity. Land prices also
increased rapidly.
Real estate values appear to have increased much more slowly in
the 1980s than they did in the 1970s. Figure 3 shows the year-over-year
percentage change in the current dollar value of nonresidential real
conditions. Some in New England have asserted that in the very weak market of recent
years appraisals have been closer to liquidation values than to long-run values; but in more
normal circumstances, it seems plausible that use of appraisals to measure returns could
reduce volatility. This point is made in Hendershott and Kane (1992b). In other studies,
returns were not measured for individual properties but based on the returns generated by
real estate investment trusts and commingled real estate funds. While this may impart
more sensitivity to changing market conditions, the investment funds’ portfolios may be
more diverse than those of the typical real estate investor.HOW THE COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE BOOM UNDID THE BANKS 71
estate held by nonfarm corporations and noncorporate businesses, as
estimated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).13 Because the value of land
and the existing stock of buildings and other structures is so large
relative to new construction, the pattern depicted in Figure 3 is driven
primarily by changing land prices and by the appreciation in the value
of existing structures, and not by investment. 14 As can be seen, the value
of nonresidential real estate grew at double-digit rates in the 1970s, and
less than half as fast in the 1980s.
While the rapid growth in real estate values in the 1970s is
consistent with the conventional wisdom that real estate was a superior
investment, the much slower rate of increase in the 1980s does not
square with investors’ enthusiasm for real estate in that decade. Did the
escalation in property values really moderate so rapidly? The BEA
estimates of the value of existing structures, upon which these figures
are based, do not reflect prices recorded in actual sales transactions (as
these are not available) but the replacement cost of the stock,is Such an
estimation approach assumes, in effect, that the value of the existing
stock keeps pace with rising construction costs. The abrupt slowdown in
inflation after 1982 resulted in a similarly abrupt slowing in the growth
of the replacement cost and, thus, in the estimated value of existing
buildings.
Given the pent-up demand for commercial space that existed at the
start of the decade and given the various incentives for investment
created by tax changes and financial deregulation, commercial real
estate values may have continued to rise rapidly in the early 1980s even
though construction costs had slowed. Without further stimulus to
demand, however, the appreciation in property values would eventu-
ally have to slow. If construction costs are rising more slowly than
prices, more construction will take place until the increased supply
dampens the rise in values. With attitudes shaped by the 1970s,
however, investors may not have recognized this inevitability.16
13 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Balance Sheets for the U. $.
Economy 1960-91, March 1992. The structures values in the Board data are from the BEA.
In estimating nonresidential real estate for Figure 3 the land component of noncorporate
real estate was allocated between residential and nonresidential purposes in proportion to
the values of residential and nonresidential structures.
14 Through most of this period, the value of nonresidential construction amounted to
only about 3 percent of the prior year’s value of nonresidential real estate. Depreciation
charges would reduce the contribution of investment even further.
1~ See the BEA 1987 publication Fixed Tangible Wealth in the United States, 1925-1985 for
a description of methodology.
16 It is also possible that the conventional wisdom about the high returns to real estate
in the early 1980s was wrong. In this regard, it is suggestive that housing prices grew more
slowly in the 1980s than they had in the 1970s. For the nation as a whole, the price of new
homes of constant quality did not keep pace with inflation. Prices of existing homes72 Lynn E. Browne and Karl E. Case
Sorting Out the Causes of Overbuilding
Poterba (1984, 1991) and others have developed a model of the
housing market that has considerable applicability to commercial prop-
erties and can be used to evaluate the various explanations for the
commercial construction boom. In this model, properties are assets, the
prices of which equal the discounted stream of rental income net of
expenses. Construction is a function of the ratio of the price of the asset
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where
I is gross commercial construction,
P is the price of commercial property,
C is the cost of construction,
R is the rental stream, which is a positive function of the under-
lying demand for space services and a negative function of the
stock of property that could supply those services,
m is maintenance and other costs of operation,
p is property taxes,
i is the nominal interest rate,
a is the risk premium associated with commercial real estate,
3 is depreciation,
~r is the expected appreciation in the value of the property,
0 is the marginal income tax rate of the property owner, and
z is the present value of depreciation allowances, per dollar of
purchase price.
In the absence of information on prices, this model implies that
investment in commercial buildings depends upon
1. construction costs,
actually sold rose faster, but at least some of this increase appears attributable to quality
changes. A comparison of constant-quality homes and new homes actually sold showed
that quality improvements accounted for some of the price increase for new homes.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Characteristics of New Housing: 1990 and computer
printout, and National Association of Realtors, Home Sales Yearbook.HOW THE COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE BOOM UNDID THE BANKS
2. the underlying demand for space and competition for tenants
from the existing stock of buildings,
3. operating costs and property taxes,
4. tax policy,
5. the cost of funds, and
6. expected appreciation.
Thus, the model incorporates most of those factors identified in the
previous section of this paper as probable causes of the construction
boom of the 1980s. It explicitly recognizes the influence of demand
factors, tax policy, and expectations of appreciation.
Table 6 presents the results of regressions based on this model.
These regressions attempt to explain the value of the two major
components of commercial construction (in 1987 dollars) in the nine
census divisions over the period 1977 to 1990. A regional approach was
used because the pattern of commercial construction varied so much
from one part of the country to another. As noted previously, surplus
space can exist in one region while another region is experiencing a
space shortage37
Separate regressions were run for the two major components of
commercial building, office buildings and "other commercial." The
latter is composed primarily of stores and related establishments. The
construction values and some of the independent variables were divided
by population to adjust for regional size variations. In all cases, it was
assumed that the relevant values of the explanatory variables were the
values at the time of the construction go-ahead decision, which, in turn,
was assumed to be two years earlier.~8
Results
The equations indicate that the construction patterns of the late
1970s and 1980s had some basis in economic fundamentals. Construc-
tion of both other commercial and office buildings was positively related
to population growth. In addition, construction of office buildings was
spurred by the expansion of finance and insurance and those service
industries that occupy office space. Rising unemployment rates were a
deterrent to both categories of construction.
17 It would be preferable to go below the regional level to states or metropolitan areas;
however, data on the value of commercial construction are available only for regions.
is The choice of lag was somewhat arbitrary. For larger projects a longer lag seems
plausible, while for small projects the lag could be shorter. Accordingly, equations using
a three-year lag for office buildings and a one-year lag for "other commercial" are
presented in Appendix Table B-1.74 Lynn E. Browne and Karl E. Case
Table 6
Regression Results
Dependent variable = per capita value of construction put in place (1987 $)
independent Variables Office Other
(All lagged 2 years) Buildings Commercial
Constant 67.8 15.4
(1.1) (.5)
Population growth 23.2* 20.3*
(4.1) (5.6)
Employment growth in tenant industries 3212,0 59.1
relative to population (1.9) (. 1 )
Change in unemployment rate -4.1 -6,4*
(-1.9) (-4.0)
Past construction relative to population .06 .1"
(1,4) (4,1)
Construction wage relative to overall wage -74.6 40.4
(-1,4) (1.2)
Construction wage relative to U.S.
construction wage
Property taxes per capita (1987 $)
Bank deposits per capita (1987 $)
Bank "other real estate owned" (OREO)
relative to real estate loans
Percent change in housing prices
Prime ratea
Dummy for 1982-1986 tax regimea
Dummy for 1987-1990 tax regimea




















Note: Regressions are pooled time series and cross-section using data on
1977 through 1990,
~ These variabl6s are the same for all regions.
.81
9 regions over the 14 years.
* Significantly different from zero at the 5% level; t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
See Appendix B for definitions of variables and sources.
But while fundamentals played a role, construction also received a
boost from the tax changes enacted in 1981. Three approaches to
measuring the effect of federal tax policy were taken. The simplest,
which is presented in Table 6, assumed three tax regimes, pre-1982, 1982
to 1986, and post-1986, and represented the latter regimes by dummyHOW THE COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE BOOM UNDID THE BANKS
variables. ~9 A second approach used the tax component of the corporate
cost of capital for investments in commercial structures, as estimated by
Henderson and Liebman (1992).20 The third assumed that the critical tax
changes were those affecting individual investors rather than corpora-
tions and used the hypothetical returns to an individual investor in a
real estate syndicate from Table 3 (no churning) as an individual tax
incentive variable. The regressions incorporating these approaches are
compared with the results in Table 6 in Appendix Table B-2. All three
approaches indicate that ERTA was a significant stimulus. For the
post-1986 era they tell somewhat different stories, however, with the
individual tax incentive variable implying a more pronounced deterio-
ration in the investment climate than the other two approaches.21
Increased lender willingness to finance real estate projects was a
further spur to construction in the 1980s. The negative relationship
between bank "other real estate owned" (OREO) and construction is
consistent with arguments that lenders’ perceptions of the risks associ-
ated with real estate affect the availability of financing and, thus, the
volume of construction. OREO includes property acquired through
foreclosure, so that high ratios of OREO to real estate loans are generally
indicative of past real estate problems. Unfavorable experience with real
estate loans in the mid 1970s resulted in banks having high ratios of
OREO to total real estate loans. This tended to depress construction in
the latter part of that decade; but by the start of the 1980s OREO had
fallen considerably, providing additional impetus to the pickup in
construction.
19 ERTA was signed into law in August 1981; therefore, its impact was assumed to be
felt in 1982.
20 Henderson and Liebman (1992) estimated the cost of capital for investment by
different industries in different asset categories. In estimating the cost of capital, they
estimated the effect of changes in tax policy, taking into account changes in depreciation
schedules and corporate tax rates. This article used their estimates of the tax component
of the cost of capital for investments in commercial structures by the services industries.
The estimates for finance, insurance, and real estate were virtually identical.
~1 Because of construction lags, the equation does not provide much insight into the
effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Assuming a two-year lag, only construction in 1989
and 1990 would have been affected by the 1986 tax changes. The approaches are all
consistent in indicating that ERTA had a substantial stimulative effect. In the tax regime
dummy approach, the stimulative effect of ERTA is indicated by the positive coefficient on
the dummy variable for the 1982-1986 period. The smaller positive coefficient for the
1987-1990 dummy implies that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA) reduced investment
incentives but that the climate for investment was still more favorable than pre-ERTA.
Henderson and Liebman’s estimates of the tax component of the corporate cost of capital
show ERTA causing a sharp reduction; in contrast, TRA had little effect, as changes in
depreciation rules were offset by the reduction in the corporate income tax rate. As shown
in Table 3, the variable representing individual investment incentives also indicates that
ERTA provided a powerful investment stimulus, but these incentives were sharply
diminished by TRA. The sign of the individual investment incentive variable is positive
and the sign of the corporate tax effect is negative, since the former is a measure of the
incentive to investment and the latter is a measure of the tax cost of investment.76 Lynn E. Browne and Karl E. Case
Lender enthusiasm for real estate loans does not necessarily mean
that financial deregulation was to blame. Indeed, favorable experience
with real estate loans in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when values were
appreciating, can be seen as an alternative explanation for banks’
subsequent eagerness to make these loans. Bank deposits were included
in the regressions because banks were major real estate lenders, partic-
ularly in the 1980s; and to the degree that bank lending is regionally
concentrated, more banking activity might be associated with higher
construction. No significant link was found, however.
Interest rates were a deterrent to the construction of other com-
mercial construction but not to construction of office buildings. Refer-
ring back to Figure 1, one can see that office construction was very
strong in the early 1980s, right when interest rates were at their peak.
One possible explanation for the failure of high interest rates to
discourage office construction is that interest on construction loans is
commonly accrued until the project is completed. Thus, high interest
rates do not impose an immediate cash flow constraint and if property
values are expected to rise, this appreciation will enable the developer to
pay the accrued interest when the completed project is sold or perma-
nently financed. Additionally, since interest rates have both a real
component and a component reflecting expectations of inflation, the
interest rate may have picked up investors" hopes of appreciation.
Although changes in home values were included in the equation in an
attempt to capture expectations of appreciation, their effect was either
negligible or negative.
The national downtown office vacancy rate was negatively associ-
ated with office construction.22 In particular, low office vacancy rates
between 1979 and 1981 contributed to the surge in office construction in
the early 1980s. The effect of low vacancies was undoubtedly reinforced
by rising rental rates. The limited information available indicates that
office rents soared in this period. In downtown Boston, for example, a
vacancy rate of roughly 2 percent coincided with an increase in rents of
50 percent between 1980 and 1982.23
While it may seem only logical that low vacancy rates would
stimulate high levels of construction, vacancy rates can change very
rapidly. Thus, they are not a very reliable guide to market conditions
three or four years in the future. The national vacancy rate rose from less
2~ Regional vacancy rates would be preferable but were unavailable. Since regional
data on the stock of commercial buildings were also unavailable, the cumulative volume of
commercial construction in prior years was used to represent the competition for tenants
from existing buildings. The sign was positive rather than negative, however. It seems
likely that this result reflects the long duration of construction projects and carryover from
one year to another. Also, a region may be attractive for construction for reasons not
captured in these equations.
~3 Coldwell Banker Commercial, 1990 Forecast handout.HOW THE COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE BOOM UNDID THE BANKS
than 5 percent in 1981 to more than 15 percent in 1985. Changes in
individual metropolitan areas were even more abrupt.
In summary, the construction patterns of the second half of the
1970s and 1980s reflect a combination of economic fundamentals, tax
changes, and changes in lender enthusiasm for real estate. Low office
vacancy rates and strong growth in finance, insurance, and various
services industries contributed to an upswing in office building at the
end of the 1970s. This was then reinforced by the investment incentives
created by ERTA and by lenders’ increased willingness to make real
estate loans.
Commercial Construction Cycles
One conclusion that follows from the preceding analysis is that the
construction of commercial buildings, particularly office buildings, is
inherently cyclical. Although tax changes played a significant role in the
commercial construction boom of the 1980s, the nature of the market
makes it vulnerable to overbuilding. Lags are a critical problem. The
ownership and financing of many projects is another.
Because buildings take several years to complete, economic condi-
tions when a project comes to fruition may be quite different from those
envisioned at the start. In the extreme the lags can be very long. The
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston’s building was originally planned in
1968, but not occupied until 1978. Boston’s celebrated Fan Pier devel-
opment, which was ultimately never started, had been in the planning
stages for more than a decade and a half, and tens of millions of dollars
had been spent on the planning process. The actual construction phase
is much shorter. A review of the Boston Inspectional Service Depart-
ment’s files on large office buildings completed between 1978 and 1989
showed the length of time in actual construction to be between 18
months and 42 months.2*
The long time and considerable dollars that developers spend in
planning large projects create a strong predisposition to go forward even
when there is evidence that the market is weakening. Typically, devel-
opers receive no compensation for work on projects that are never built.
Given the longevity of office buildings, it could be argued that economic
conditions at the project’s completion date should be irrelevant, that
what really matters are conditions over the building’s entire life.
However, because many projects are highly leveraged and their owners
are partners whose commitments are limited or whose business is real
estate, a project that comes on line when vacancy rates are high and
The average time seemed to be between 24 and 30 months.78 Lynn E. Browne and Karl E. Case
rents declining may not generate sufficient cash flow to service its debt
and the owners may not have the financial resources to sustain pay-
ments until conditions improve.25
Apart from increasing the likelihood of mistakes, construction lags
create an inherent tendency towards periodic overbuilding. This is
illustrated in the diagrams in Figure 4, which represent in simplified
fashion the dynamics of supply and demand in the commercial space
market. The central feature of the charts is the fact that the supply of
space is more elastic over time (SL) than in the short run (SS).
Accordingly, an increase in the demand for space initially generates only
a small supply response. Rents temporarily rise above the level that
will result when additional supply is forthcoming. If developers and
lenders react to these temporarily high rents, rather than anticipating
the increase in supply, they will build too much and rents will be driven
below what would otherwise have been the long-run equilibrium.
Further complicating and aggravating these tendencies is the dura-
tion of rental agreements. Rental agreements commonly extend over
several years. Thus, when the demand for space increases, most existing
tenants do not face automatic rent increases and therefore have no
incentive to curtail their present space usage. Typical rental agreements
contribute to the problem by prohibiting tenants from subleasing in
order to take advantage of higher rents.
The result is that new and expanding tenants cannot compete for
the bulk of the space occupied by existing tenants. Instead, they must
bid for the small increment to space that is available in the short run, as
well as any space released by expiring leases. As a consequence, the
rents paid by new and expanding tenants in a rising market are even
higher than the levels that would have existed if existing leases could be
renegotiated and rents were increasing for all.
If developers and lenders assume these marginal rents represent
the new market equilibrium, they will be disappointed. Not only will too
much new space be created, but as existing leases expire, tenants will
react to the higher rent levels and curtail their usage. Vacancy rates will
rise, putting downward pressure on rents.26
Do market participants really react to short-term marginal rents? A
widely accepted method for determining the value of a commercial
2~ In a world of perfect foresight, the owners could borrow more to tide them over, but
that does not seem to be the world of commercial real estate. Also, banks that provide
construction financing, based on assurances that an insurance company or pension fund
will provide the permanent financing, may find that the permanent loans fail to
materialize when the economy sours, leaving them stuck with the project.
26 It should be recognized that the situations in rising and declining markets are not
symmetric. Because buildings do not disappear, supply cannot be contracted as readily in
the long run as it can be expanded. Additionally, average rent levels will follow marginal
rents down faster than they follow them up, as existing tenants will try to renegofiate their
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Figure 4
The Hog Cycle: Overbuilding Caused by an
Inelastic Short-Run Supply Curve and an
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property is the "income approach," which is based on a forecast of
future rents and vacancy rates. Commonly, appraisers use current
leases (corrected for tenant improvements and free rental periods) to
estimate the current "level" of rents and then project these into the
future based on recent "trends." During periods of rising rents, mar-
ginal rents are above average rents and projecting a continuation of past
upward trends will, if anything, exacerbate the tendency towards
overbuilding depicted in Figure 4. In a period of declining rents,
marginal rents are below average rents and an appraisal based on
marginal rents may be overly pessimistic; when tenants renew their
leases, the more favorable terms will encourage expansion and moder-
ate the decline in rents.27
An examination of a number of "private placement memoranda"
(the legal equivalent of a prospectus for a public offering) for office
developments between 1984 and 1986 shows that marginal rents and
optimistic assumptions about rates of increase were used in appraisal
reports to attract investors and to support debt financing. The public
sector also uses marginal rents and assumptions about growth rates
to influence investor and developer behavior. For example, an analysis
of the Boston market made by the Boston Redevelopment Authority
in 1986 predicted that "By 1990 asking rents may be in the $37-46 range,
17 percent to 47 percent above the $31 level seen in 1986" (BRA 1986
p. 41).
Lender attitudes towards real estate loans also contribute to over-
shooting by prolonging the construction buildup or contraction. Other
things equal, construction levels tend to be higher if lenders’ past
experience with real estate loans was positive. This suggests that
following a period in which conditions favored new construction and
lenders achieved good results, lenders may remain receptive to real
estate lending even if the underlying economic conditions and invest-
ment incentives have changed. Similarly, unfortunate experiences with
past real estate loans cause lenders to shy away from lending even
though current conditions might justify increased construction.
Yet a further complication arises from the fact that the finance and
insurance industries that supply much of the real estate financing and
generate substantial revenues from this lending are also major tenants
of office buildings. Their rapid expansion creates a demand for office
space, but their growth depends, in part, on revenues from construction
and real estate lending. Thus, the construction boom fueled the growth
27 Hendershott and Kane (1992b) present evidence that in the early stages of decline,
appraisals tend to be based on average rents, not marginal rents. Thus, during a "turn" in
the cycle, the data used in decision-making may lag actual market conditions. Once a
downturn is well established, however, assumptions about longer-run average rents that
are based on current marginal rents may be overly pessimistic.HOW THE COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE BOOM UNDID THE BANKS 81
of these industries and was, in turn, fueled by their growth (Browne
1992). In similar fashion, the real estate bust has fed back to these same
sectors and their difficulties have, in turn, reduced the demand for office
space.
Extent and Incidence of the Problem
With rising vacancies and falling rents in many parts of the country,
building values deteriorated and cash flows were insufficient to carry
contract debt service. Because many buildings were owned by limited
partners, whose obligations ended once their equity was lost, and by
general partners, whose personal guarantees were backed by real estate,
buildings frequently ended up in default to banks and, more recently, to
insurance companies and pension funds.28
Although high leverage was an important part of the problem, deals
with low leverage and high initial equity went sour as well. As a recent
example, a major pension fund held a second mortgage position of
approximately $70 million in a building that had been appraised at over
$200 million dollars three years earlier. The building also carried a $90
million first mortgage. In the summer of 1992, the fund was notified that
the second mortgage had no value at all, since the current value of the
building had fallen below $90 million. How could a building lose more
than 60 percent of its value in such a short period?
The answer can be seen in Table 7. Since the Tax Reform Act of
1986, building values can be approximated using a simple cash flow
approach. The starting point is gross rent per square foot; gross rent
takes into account all tenant improvements paid for by the landlord, any
free rent offered to the tenant, as well as the likely pattern of lease
renegotiations and/or rollovers. Gross rent is then adjusted for the
expected vacancy rate to obtain effective gross rent.29 Net effective rent
is obtained by subtracting taxes and operating costs.
The building’s value can be approximated by dividing net effective
rent by the appropriate "cap rate" and multiplying by the number of
2n Lenders frequently did not require general partners to provide personal guarantees.
Projects are often structured so that the general partners’ obligations are compartmental-
ized.
~9 Calculating effective gross rent can be a daunting task in a falling market. An
examination of actual office leases in Boston over the past two years reveals an infinite
variety of devices that lower effective rents without lowering face rents. One recent
negotiation led to a ten-year lease on 70,000 square feet of class A office space. The face
rent on the lease was $35 per foot per year, rising to $42 after five years. However, the first
two years and five months are free (the five months was added as a $1,000,000 "signing
bonus" to the tenant). The landlord also agreed to finance improvements costing $40 per
square foot. Over the ten-year period, these concessions reduce effective gross rent to a flat
$20.75 per square foot.82 Lynn E. Browne and Karl E. Case
Table 7
Sensitivity of Real Estate Values to Rent Levels, Vacancy Rates, and Cap Rates
(1)     (2)      (3)      (4) (5)
14 percent Further    Vacancy
Starting decrease in decrease in rate of Increase in
Item values gross rent gross rent 10 percent cap rate
Gross Rent
(per square foot) $ 35 $ 30 $ 20 $ 20 $ 20
Vacancy Rate 0 0 0 10% 10%
Effective Gross Rent $ 35 $ 30 $ 20 $18 $18
- Taxes 5 5 5 5 5
- Qperating Expenses 5 5 5 5 5
Net Effective Rent $ 25 $ 20 $10 $ 8 $ 8
"Cap" Rate 9% 9% 9% 9% 12%
Present discounted value
of 100,000 square feet $ 27.8m $ 22.2m $11.1m $ 8.9m $ 6.7m
Loss from (1) -20.1% -60.1% -68.0% -75.9%
Source: Authors’ calculations.
square feet in the building. The cap rate is essentially the rate of return
that a buyer would require to justify purchasing the building. Cap rates
move positively with interest rates and other rates of return and also
with the perceived risk in real estate.
Column (1) in Table 7 shows these calculations for an office building
renting for $35 per foot with a zero vacancy rate. Subtracting taxes and
operating costs of $10 per square foot leaves a net effective rent of $25.
A cap rate of 9 percent produces a value of $27.8 million for each 100,000
square feet.
Column (2) shows the result of a 14 percent decrease in gross rent,
from $35 to $30. Value falls by more than 14 percent because value
depends on net rents; and since taxes and operating costs have not
changed, the net rent and building value have fallen by 20 percent. This
same point is illustrated in column (3). Now gross rents have fallen by
just over 40 percent, but building value drops by 60 percent from the
original value.
Recent rent declines have been accompanied by increases in va-
cancy rates. Column (4) assumes a 10 percent vacancy rate, which is
equivalent to a 10 percent ($2) drop in gross rent. This reduces building
value by 20 percent because, with no change in taxes and operating
costs, net rent falls by 20 percent. Finally, column (5) shows the impact
of a modest rise in the cap rate that might occur in a period of rising
vacancies and falling rent. Putting all this together, a value of $27.8
million is reduced to $6.7 million, a drop of more than 75 percent. Many
buildings in the United States have experienced decreases of this
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Table 8
Estimated Value of the Office Stock in the Boston Metropolitan Area,
1987 and 1992
Downtown Suburban Total
Item 1987 1992 1987 1992
Gross Renta $35.00 $23.00 $24.00 $15,00
Vacancy Rateb 9% 20% 18% 22%
Effective Gross Rent $31.85 $18.40 $19.68 $11.70
- Taxes° 5.00 5.00 3.50 4.00
- Operating Expenses° 5.00 5.00 3,50 4.00
Net Effective Rent $21.85 $8.40 $12.68 $3.70
"Cap" Rate’~ 9% 11% 9% 11%
Value/Square Foot $243.00 $76.00 $141.00 $34.00
Total Square Feet~ 50m 50m 60m 60m
Total Value $12.1b $3.8b $8.5b $2.0b
1987    1992
$20.6b $5.8b
’~ 1987 figure based on National Real Estate Index and verified by interviews with Boston property owners
and operators. 1992 figure based on analysis of 20 leases signed during 1991 and 1992, Gross rent is the
current average marginal rent charged per square foot, adjusted for free rent and tenant improvements.
b Coldwell Banker CommeroialfTorto Wheaton Research, Office Vacancy index,
c Based on a review of 50 leases signed between 1987 and 1991 as well as interviews with property
owners and managers.
’~ National Real Estate Index as well as interviews with real estate portfolio managers.
e Figures are approximate based on annual market reports from Whittier Partners, Spaulding and Slye,
Grubb and Ellis, and Hunneman. Between 1987 and 1992, approximately 10 million square feet of space
was added to the metropolitan area stock, To show the change in value of the stock, however, reported
total square feet is the 1987 figure in both years.
Building valuations should not simply reflect today’s rents, but the
stream of net rents expected over the building’s life. Most property was
not recorded on balance sheets at peak. rents and values and many
would argue that calculations based on 1992’s depressed rents under-
state true valuations. Nevertheless, even those who think that values
based on today’s rents are too low base decisions on these values. It is
one thing to think a value is too low; it is another to risk money that the
true value is higher.
Table 8 shows the decline in value that seems to have occurred in
the Boston office market when values are based on current rental
agreements. The downtown market in Boston contains approximately
50 million square feet of office space. At the peak of the cycle, leases
were being closed at an average of $35 per square foot per year. An
examination of recent lease negotiations revealed a very high variance
but suggested a figure of $23 for 1992.30 Operating costs and taxes have
~0 Effective gross rents in many cases are well below $20. Although marginal effective
rents are probably below $20, many buildings still have leases in effect at the old, higher
i:ates.84 Lynn E. Browne and Karl E. Case
Table 9
Estimated Value of the Office Stock in the United States, 1987 and 1992
Item 1987 1992
Gross Renta $ 22.00 $17.00
Vacancy Rateb 15% 19%
Effective Gross Rent $ 18.70 $13.77
- Taxesc 4.00 4.50
- Operating Expenses° 4.00 4.50
Net Effective Rent $ 10.70 $ 4,77
Cap Rated 9% 11%
Value/Square Foot $11900 $43.00
Total Square Feete 5-6 billion 5-6 billion
Total Value $594-713 billion $217-260 billion
aGross marginal rents based on the National Real Estate Index for 1987 and interviews with real estate
portfolio managers for 1992.
bCoIdwell Banker Commercial/Torto Wheaton Research, Office Vacancy index.
°Based on interviews with property managers and real estate portfolio investors.
dNational Real Estate Index and interviews with real estate portfolio investors.
°Rough approximation based on several sources including National Association of industrial and Office
Parks, and Laing (1992). The figures were assumed to be the same in both years, in order to capture the
rough change in the value of the existing stock.
stayed at about $10 per square foot since 1987. Finally, while interest
rates have fallen, the perceived risk of commercial real estate has risen.
Knowledgeable investors suggested that the cap rate had increased from
9 percent in 1987 to 11 or 12 percent. The table also presents calculations
for the 60 million square foot suburban market. The conclusion: since
1987, the value of the Boston metropolitan area office stock, downtown
and suburban, appears to have fallen more than 70 percent, from over
$20 billion to less than $6 billion.~1 Again, it must be emphasized that,
while values are commonly calculated in this manner, assuming current
rents in perpetuity is very pessimistic.
Table 9 makes a similar approximation for the United States as a
whole. The U.S. office market contains between 5 billion and 6 billion
square feet of space. At the peak of the market, that space was probably
worth between $600 and $700 billion. In aggregate, it has lost between
$350 and $450 billion of that value.
31 It is interesting to note that the average owner-occupied housing unit has lost about
20 percent of its value since 1987. The value of the 700,000 owner-occupied units in the
Boston metropolitan area was approximately $130 billion at the peak of the cycle. A decline
of 20 percent means a drop of about $26 billion in household net worth in the Boston area.
This is about twice the size of the decline in the value of the office stock. If retail, industrial,
and R&D space were added, the decline in the value of nonresidential property is likely of
the same order of magnitude and the total decline in real estate values is probably closer
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To put these figures in perspective, a decline of $300 billion is roughly
equivalent to a drop in the aggregate value of the U.S. stock market of
about 7 percent. Of course, these calculations do not include declines in
the value of retail or industrial space. Retail space represents another 4
billion to 5 billion square feet. Moreover, the distribution of real estate
losses differs from that of a drop in the stock market. While some
buildings back mortgages held by pension funds and insurance compa-
nies, many were standing behind the portfolio investments of banks
operating on thin capital requirements. Thus, the impact of the decline
in commercial real estate values on the banking industry has been much
greater than that of a similar decline in the value of the stock market.
Summary and Conclusions
The United States is suffering the aftermath of a boom in commer-
cial construction. The upswing in office construction was particularly
pronounced, with the real value of office construction more than tripling
between the late 1970s and the mid 1980s. So much building was too
much. By 1985, the national downtown office vacancy rate had sur-
passed 15 percent; and by the end of the decade it was close to 20
percent, and rents and property values were falling.
A number of factors contributed to the boom. Commercial construc-
tion levels in the late 1970s were low, while those industries that occupy
commercial space, especially office space, grew strongly. As a conse-
quence, office vacancy rates were low at the end of the 1970s and rents
were moving up rapidly. A recovery in office construction was already
under way when the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 created
additional investment incentives. ERTA both encouraged corporate
investment and created substantial tax shelter opportunities for individ-
uals investing in commercial real estate.
Further reinforcing these trends was lender enthusiasm for real
estate loans. Lenders’ experience with real estate loans in the second half of
the 1970s was favorable, as real estate values rose rapidly. Nor were
lenders alone in thinking that real estate was an attractive investment; a
number of scholarly articles appeared in the late 1970s and early 1980s
showing how real estate had outperformed alternative investments.
But while the boom had multiple origins, it was not pure chance
that these forces came together. Commercial construction, espedally office
construction, appears inherently vulnerable to overshooting. Time lags and
key determinants tend to reinforce one another. Even the 1981 tax
incentives were magnified by other developments. In particular, expec-
tations of rising property values and the prospect of capital gains made
the returns to investors in real estate syndicates all the more attractive.
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and because rental agreements extend over several years, an unexpect-
edly tight market can send rent levels for new tenants and renewals
skyrocketing. If developers and lenders assume that these rents repre-
sent the new market equilibrium, too much building will occur--with
the result that rents will be driven lower and vacancy rates pushed
higher than would otherwise be the case.
Before that happens, however, the overbuilding may feed on itself.
Real estate valuations that are based on short-term rents and vacancy
rates will soar. Lenders will experience very good results with real estate
loans: with rising valuations, plenty of eager buyers and lenders will
rescue any property in difficulty. Good results with real estate loans will
make lenders more willing to lend in the future. In addition, good
earnings will encourage lenders’ own expansion, increasing the demand
for office space.
At some point, the boom comes to an end. An unexpected disrup-
tion to the demand for space, such as occurred in the Southwest
following the decline in oil prices or in New York City after the stock
market crash, may be the precipitating factor. Or the increase in
construction may simply push up vacancy rates and rent levels begin to
soften, as happened in much of the country in the latter part of the
1980s. But once the boom starts to unwind, it does so with surprising
speed. Rents fall, values fall even more, lenders suffer losses and
become increasingly cautious. As potential buyers are unable to obtain
financing, property values fall even more. And lender-tenants’ efforts to
bolster earnings by cutting costs further increase the surplus office space.
While office construction seems inherently cyclical, the fallout of the
1980s construction boom was particularly severe for the banking indus-
try, for several reasons. First, banks moved very aggressively into
commercial mortgages. Second, borrowers in the 1980s were frequently
partnerships and individuals whose assets were either protected from
the banks’ reach or concentrated in real estate, the value of which
collapsed in the bust. Third, commercial real estate values are extraor-
dinarily sensitive to the assumptions made about vacancy rates and rent
levels. The difference between the assumptions made in rising and in
declining markets can easily wipe out the owners’ equity and drop
property values below loan amounts.
It is also clear that the recent real estate cycle has created conditions
that are a drag on the macroeconomy. Because of overbuilding, commercial
construction cannot itself contribute to the recovery. In addition, commer-
cial real estate losses and the resulting poor condition of bank balance
sheets appear to have made banks more cautious and pushed them more
towards holding government securities and away from making loans.32
32 This shift also reflects "spreads" between short and long rates that make long
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Looking forward, it seems probable that commercial construction
will remain in the doldrums for some years. Space is now abundant and
even when market conditions improve, lenders will initially be reluctant
to finance new projects. Eventually, however, as the economy expands,
vacancy rates will fall and rent levels will move up. Property values will
start to rise. The stage will be set for another swing of the pendulum.
Will those making the building and lending decisions in that future time
remember the experience of the 1980s?
Appendix A: The Effects of Tax Changes on the Attractiveness of
Real Estate Investments for High-Income Individuals
The essence of a real estate tax shelter is the use of depreciation deductions to create
paper losses during the time a building is owned. When the building is sold, a tax must
be paid on the difference between the selling price and the depreciated book value, but
until 1986, 60 percent of such gains were excluded from the tax base as long as the holding
period was more than six months. In essence, as long as real estate held its value or
appreciated, the tax rules provided individual owners an opportunity to convert ordinary
income into capital gains and to defer paying taxes.
The pre-1981 tax code provided significant benefits to investing in real estate. The
most important features of the pre-1981 code were the very high marginal tax rate of 70
percent and the preferential treatment of capital gains. The depreciation period was 41
years, but properties could be depreciated using a 150 percent declining balance method.
An investment of $1000 made in year 0 and sold in year 7 for $1000 generated tax benefits
of $75.20. If we allow for "churning" by assuming that the $1000 asset is sold for $1000 in
years 7, 14 and 21, the benefits jump to $138.80.
The 1981 Act reduced the top marginal rate from 70 percent to 50 percent but reduced
the depreciation period for buildings from 41 years to 15 years. Buildings could be
depreciated using the 175 percent declining balance method; if accelerated methods were
chosen, subsequent capital gains were "recaptured" as ordinary income. If, however,
straight line depreciation were used, later capital gains were subject to the 60 percent
exclusion. Appendix Table A-1 shows that for a holding period of 7 years, straight line
methods with no recapture generated almost twice the benefits of accelerated methods.
For this paper, a number of private and public syndicated limited partnerships were
examined. All of them opted for straight line depreciation. The straight line method is
preferable only if the plan is to resell after a few years; any partnership that intended to
hold a building over an extended period of time would choose accelerated methods. Hines
(1987) cited the fact that the vast majority of limited partnerships chose straight line
depreciation methods as strong evidence of the intent to "churn."
While the lower marginal tax rate after 1981 reduced the tax saving from each dollar
of deduction, the shorter life dramatically increased the size of the deductions. As a result,
the present value of depreciation deductions on a $1000 asset using a 9 percent discount
rate and 7 years to sale increased over 40 percent, from $75.20 to $105.80. If the building
were resold in years 14 and 21, the value jumped to $195.30. In 1984, real estate was
reclassified as 18-year property, and in 1985 its life was further increased to 19 years. The
1984 changes reduced the present value of tax benefits by about 17 percent.
Then came the Tax Reform Act of 1986; TRA86 extended the depreciation period to
31.5 years, cut the top marginal rate for individuals to 33 percent, and eliminated
preferential treatment of capital gains. This combination wiped out essentially the entire
tax incentive to own commercial real estate.
real estate, financial institutions would probably be playing a more active role in
stimulating a recovery.88 Lynn E. Browne and Karl E. Case
Appendix Table A-1
Tax Shelter Provisions: Value of Tax Deferral and Conversion of Ordinary
Income into Capital Gains for Real Property (Per $1000 in Building Value)
Property is sold in year 7 for its original value
Pre-ERTA (150% Declining Balance; 41-Year Life)
Present
Marginal Tax Discounted
Year Depreciation Tax Rate Saving Value (9%)
1 $ 36.58 .70 $ 25.62 $ 23.50
2 35.24 .70 24.67 20.76
3 33.95 .70 23.77 18.35
4 32.71 .70 22.90 16.22
5 31,51 .70 22.06 14.34
6 30.36 .70 21.25 12.68
7 Capital Gains Taxa (56.10) (30.69)
Total Benefit $ 75,17
a Accumulated depreciation ($200,35) x (1 - .6) x .7 = $56.10
1982-1984 (Accelerated 175% Declining Balance/Full Recapture; 15-Year Life)
Present
Marginal Tax Discounted
Year Depreciation Tax Rate Saving Value (9%)
1 $120.09 .50 $ 60.00 $ 55.05
2 100.00 .50 50.00 42,08
3 90.00 .50 45.00 34.75
4 80.00 .50 40.00 28.34
5 70.00 .50 35.00 22,75
6 60.00 .50 30.00 17.89
7 Capital Gains Taxb (260.00) (142.23)
Total Benefit $ 58,62
b Accumulated depreciation ($520.00) x ,5 = $260,00
1982-1984 (Straight Line/No Recapture; 15-Year Life)
Present
Marginal Tax Discounted
Year Depreciation Tax Rate Saving Value (9%)
1 $ 66,67 ,50 $ 33,33 $ 30,58
2 66.67 .50 33.33 28.06
3 66.67 ,50 33,33 25,74
4 66.67 .50 33.33 23,61
5 66.67 ,50 33,33 21,66
6 66.67 .50 33.33 19.88
7 Capital Gains Tax° (80,00) (43.76)
Total Benefit $105.77
Accumulated depreciation ($400.00) x (1 - .6) x .5 = $80,00HOW THE COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE BOOM UNDID THE BANKS 89
Appendix Table A-1 continued
Tax Shelter Provisions: Value of Tax Deferral and Conversion of Ordinary
Income into Capital Gains for Real Property (Per $1000 in Building Value)
Property is sold in year 7 for its original value
1985-1986 (Straight Line/No Recapture; 18-Year Life)
Marginal Tax
Year Depreciation Tax Rate Saving
1 $ 55.56 .50 $ 27.78
2 55.56 .50 27.78
3 55.56 .50 27.78
4 55.56 .50 27.78
5 55.56 .50 27.78
6 55.56 .50 27.78













d Accumulated depreciation ($333.33) x (1 - .6) x .5 = $66.67
Post-1986 (Straight Line; 31.5-Year Life)
Marginal Tax
Year Depreciation Tax Rate Saving
1 $ 31,75 .33 $10.48
2 31.75 .33 10.48
3 31.75 .33 10.48
4 31.75 .33 10,48
5 31.75 .33 10.48
6 31.75 .33 10.48
7 Capital Gains Taxe (62,85)
Total Benefit
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Appendix B: Definitions of Variables and Sources of Regression
Variables
All variables refer to the nine census regions except where noted. Census regions:
New England (NE): CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT.
Mid Atlantic (MA): NY, NJ, PA.
East North Central (ENC): IL, IN, MI, OH, WI.
West North Central (WNC): IA, KS, MN, MO, ND, NE, SD.
South Atlantic (SAT): DC, DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV.
East South Central (ESC): AL, KY, MS, TN.
West South Central (WSC): AR, LA, OK, TX.
Mountain (MT): AZ, CO, ID, MT, NM, NV, UT, WY.
Pacific (PAC): AK, CA, HI, OR, WA.
Dependent Variables
Value of construction put in place per capita: Separate regressions were run for office
construction and other commercial construction. Regional current dollar values were
converted to constant dollars by dividing by the national deflator (calculated by dividing
U.S. current dollar construction put in place by U.S. constant dollar construction).
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Construction Reports--Value of New Construction
Put in Place.
Explanatory Variables
Explanatory variables were lagged two years in the regressions reported in Table 6.
Population Growth: Percent change in population.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Total Personal Income by Major Source
and Earnings by Industry, computer tape.
Employment Growth in Tenant Industries Relative to Population: Office~Office tenant indus-
tries were defined as including Banking and Credit Agencies, Securities and Commodities
Brokers and Services, Insurance Carriers, Business Services, Legal Services, Engineering
and Management Services, and Miscellaneous Services. The change in employment from
year t-3 to year t was divided by the population in year t.
Other Commercial~Other commercial tenant industries were defined as including Whole-
sale Trade, Retail Trade, and Services, and excluding Hotels and Other Lodging Places,
Private Households, Educational Services, and one-half of Health Services. The change in
employment from year t-3 to year t was divided by the population in year t.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Total Full-Time and Part-Time Employment by
Industry, computer tape.
Change in Unemployment Rate:
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment,
various issues. Data for 1978-1981 were obtained from unpublished tabulations supplied
by the BLS.
Per Capita Income: Per capita income was deflated by the U.S. Consumer Price Index.
Source: Income and population figures from BEA. CPI from Economic Report of the President,
February 1992.
Past Construction Relative to Population: Cumulative constant dollar construction in years t,
t-l, and t-2 was divided by population in year t. (As for all explanatory variables, this
was lagged two years.) Past office construction was used in the office equations and other
commercial in those equations.
Source: as described above for dependent variables.HOW THE COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE BOOM UNDID THE BANKS 91
Construction Wage Relative to Overall Wage and Construction Wage Relative to U.S. Construction
Wage: The regional construction wage was calculated by dividing regional construction
earnings by regional construction employment and the overall wage by dividing total
regional earnings by total regional employment. The U.S construction wage was calculated
by dividing U.S. construction earnings by U.S. construction employment.
Source: BEA.
Property Taxes per Capita: State and local property tax revenues per capita were deflated by
the U.S. CPI.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances and Governmental Finances,
obtained through DRI/McGraw-Hill.
Bank Deposits per Capita: Commercial banks’ total deposits per capita were deflated by the
U.S. CPL
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, call report data, obtained from Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Bank OREO Relative to Real Estate Loans: Calculated as other real estate owned divided by
loans secured by real estate,
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, call report data, obtained from Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Percent Changes in Housing Prices: State figures on prices of homes purchased with
conventional mortgages were weighted according to the 1980 stock of owner-occupied
homes to create regional home price figures.
Source: Federal Housing Finance Board, Rates and Terms on Conventional Mortgages 1991,
and U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Housing.
The following variables were the same for all regions:
Prime Rate: Prime rate charged by banks.
Source: Economic Report of the President, February 1992.
Dummy for 1982-1986 tax regime: This variable had a value of i for the years 1982 through
1986 and zero for all other years.
Dummy for 1987-1990 tax regime: This variable had a value of 1 for the years 1987 through
1990 and zero for all other years.
Tax on Corporate Investment: Tax component of cost of capital estimates developed by
Henderson and Liebman (1992). The tax effects included both changes in corporate tax
rates and changes in the value of depreciation deductions. The authors made separate
estimates for investments by different industries in different assets. The figures for services
investment in commercial structures were used in the regression.
Effect of tax incentives on individual investors: The "no churning" estimates from Table 3 of the
text were used.
National Downtown Office Vacancy Rate:
Source: CB Commercial/Torto Wheaton Research, private communication.Appendix Table B-1
Regression Results: Alternative Lags
Dependent variable = per capita value of construction put in place (1987 $)
Office Buildings--Lagged 3 Years Other Commercial--Lagged 1 Year
Independent Variables
Individual
Tax Regime Corporate Investment
Dummies Tax Effect Incentive
Individual
Tax Regime Corporate Investment





Employment growth in tenant industries 1627.3
relative to population (.8)
Change in unemployment rate -3.6
(-1.5)
Past construction relative to population -.04
(-.8)
Construction wage relative to overall wage -131.5*
(-2,2)
Construction wage relative to U.S. 82.8
construction wage (1.5)
Property taxes per capita (1987 $) 113.8"
(3.3)
Bank deposits per capita (1987 $) ,005
(1,8)









































(-2.2) (-1.7) (-1.2)Appendix Table B-1 continued
Regression Results: Alternative Lags
Dependent variable = per capita value of construction put in place (1987 $)
Office Buildings--Lagged 3 Years
Independent Variables
Individual
Tax Regime Corporate Investment
Dummies Tax Effect Incentive
Other Commercial--Lagged 1 Year
Individual
Tax Regime Corporate Investment














Percent change in housing prices
Prime ratea
Dummy for 1982-1986 tax regimea
Dummy for 1987-1990 tax regimea
Tax on corporate investmentsa
Effect of tax incentives on individual
investorsa

















Note: Regressions are pooled time series and cross-section using data on 9 regions. Office regression ran over 13 years (1978 to 1990), other commeroial over 15 years.
See Appendix B for definitions of variables and sources.
aThese variables are the same for all regions.
*Significantly different from zero at the 5% level; t-statistics are shown in parentheses,Appendix Table B-2
Regression Results: Alternative Tax Approaches
Dependent variable = per capita value of construction put in place (1987 $)
Independent Variables
(All lagged 2 years)
Constant
Population growth
Employment growth in tenant industries
relative to population
Change in unemployment rate
Past construction relative to population
Construction wage relative to overall wage
Construction wage relative to U.S.
construction wage
Property taxes per capita (1987 $)
Bank deposits per capita (1987 $)
Bank OREQ relative to real estate loans














































































































(-1.7)Appendix Table B-2 continued
Regression Results: Alternative Tax Approaches
Dependent variable = per capita value of construction put in place (1987 $)
Independent Variables
(All lagged 2 years)
Percent change in housing prices
Prime ratea
Dummy for 1982-1986 tax regimea
Dummy for 1987-1990 tax regimea
Tax on corporate investmentsa
Effect of tax incentives on individual
investorsa
National downtown office vacancy ratea
Office Buildings
Individual
Tax Regime Corporate Investment Tax Regime





-.04 -.6 -.6 -.4 - 1.0" - 1.5"
(-.07) (-.8) (-1.0 (-1.0) (-2.2) (-3.2)
.4 .4 1.6 -2.0* -2.7* -2.9*













~2 .73 ,69 .70
Note: Regressions are pooled time series and cross-section using data on 9 regions over the 14 years, 1977 through 1990.
See Appendix B for definitions of variables and sources.
aThese variables are the same for all regions.
*Significantly different from zero at the 5% level; t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
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Peter C. Aldrich*
The paper presented by Lynn Browne and Karl Case alleges that the
commercial construction business is inherently cyclical and that its most
recent cycle, in the 1980s, was amplified by three notable environmental
changes: stimulative changes in tax legislation; institutional changes, in
particular the deregulation of financial institutions; and a change in the
perception of real estate to that of a low-risk but high-return investment
medium. The paper deals primarily with the heavy price paid by banks
for their involvement in this construction cycle. The authors allege that
the bankers’ two primary faults were to increase their lending to the real
estate sector and to do so to remote, single-asset borrowers, who lacked
the creditworthiness of their former corporate customers. The paper is
divided into five parts and a conclusion. These comments will be
organized in a similar fashion.
Commercial Construction Patterns
Part one discusses the patterns of commercial construction during
the several most recent cycles. This discussion is not important to the
paper, and I believe it generally detracts from it. Others have dealt more
thoroughly with this phenomenon. But my major complaint comes from
this topic sentence: "While most parts of the country saw increases in
commercial construction in the 1980s, the differences were striking.’"
This is an odd observation, since the paper goes on to find nothing but
*President, Aldrich, Eastman & Waltch, L.P.DISCUSSION 99
similarities in all regions of the country. It does so by assigning the same
three broad causal factors to all sectors of the country.
I interpreted this section of the paper as merely a justification for the
rather more complex modeling done in the third section: the application
of the Poterba model of the housing market to the commercial property
market. This is the least convincing portion of the paper. While the
model is certainly interesting, and one could quibble about its construc-
tion, as a practitioner I found that no useful results were developed by
the analysis. The authors were unable to shed light on the various
regional differences in any meaningful way, nor did they choose to
explore some of the rather interesting mysteries, hinted at by the
outcome of the model, that were at variance with intuition or experi-
ence. As an example of such a lost opportunity, the authors did not
investigate in greater detail the rather incredibly counterintuitive result
that challenges much of the argument of the paper: that no higher
construction activity was associated with increased banking activity.
Fascinating dynamics of the development of the national real estate
market lurk behind this interesting inconsistency.
The authors also miss an opportunity to demonstrate the similarity
of the recent scenario to the performance of the real estate boom and
bust cycle in the early 1970s, the REIT collapse, a comparison thoroughly
supportive of their more important conclusions in the fourth section of
the paper. Another lost opportunity to support the heart of their thesis
appears in the following observation: "Since buildings are not mobile, a
surplus of space in one area does nothing to relieve the demand for
space elsewhere." This is simply wrong. Surplus building in satellite
markets lowers the cost structure of those markets and does effectively
"move buildings," by moving vacancy from the satellite market to the
core market. Anyone studying the development of a mark6t such as
Phoenix versus its core in Los Angeles knows that over any appreciable
length of time, surpluses of space do move away from the low-cost
provider. This is an interesting demonstration of the inherent long-term
cyclicality that the authors so successfully highlight in the fourth section
of their paper. This point speaks directly to the primary value of the
Browne-Case paper, which is an explanation of the mechanism that
forces substantial cyclical lags on the real estate construction and finance
business.
Causes of the Boom
The .second section of Browne and Case’s paper deals at some
length with tax code changes. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
(ERTA) was definitely a measure that added gasoline to an existing fire.100 Peter C. Aldrich
The fire was inflation. This is broadly acknowledged. ERTA was very bad
public policy, and the paper adds little to this argument.1
The paper jumps from the widely acknowledged impact of ERTA to
a presumption that the problem of escalating real estate values and bank
involvement derived from too heavy a reliance on limited partnership
investments. It misses a point critical to an understanding of this and
prior real estate cycles: all capital was seeking inflation-hedging assets.
The authors are further misled by the McClure study of Boston that
alleges that "85 percent of office buildings were owned by individuals in
partnerships.’" This statement is misleading for a number of reasons:
1) Corporations that were otherwise healthy and robust often used
partnerships and other single-purpose remote entities to hold
real estate. Indeed, current studies show little significant change
in the proportions of holdings of commercial properties by the
major classes of holders. Nonfinancial corporations held approx-
imately 62 percent of commercial property, partnerships only
13 percent (Arthur Andersen & Co. for Institute of Real Estate
Management).
2) Partnership owners such as those found by McClure in his study
of Boston buildings were themselves frequently only "tax lend-
ers" under ERTA. The real economic benefits of ownership were
often held by institutional or corporate hybrid lenders.
3) The alleged great move to individual and less creditworthy
nonbusiness corporate owners, discussed on a number of occa-
sions in the paper, does not account for the "fact," alleged
equally often, that the period from 1975 to 1986 was really the
great period of the "depersonalization" of the national real estate
market. It was a period of increased "institutionalization" of real
estate capital markets. For instance, this was the period when
domestic pension funds, in competition with foreigners and
insurance institutions, built up a portfolio of over $120 billion in
real estate equity. Had the authors acknowledged this, they
would have been drawn to look more closely at the tremendous
growth in commercial real estate credit outstanding, a major
shortcoming of the paper.
1 Indeed, a chilling account of what ERTA could do was published by the Boston Fed’s
Richard Kopcke and me in the Spring 1984 issue of the Journal of Portfolio Management: "A
Real Estate Crisis: Averted or Just Postponed?" The subheading of the article reads: "The
developments that averted the potential real estate crisis did not insulate the market from
future crisis; instead, they further exposed it." That article was itself the continuation of an
earlier piece produced in the Winter 1983 Real Estate Review: "Real Estate Consequences of
the New Capital Markets," with a subheading that reads: "Real estate lending is now
short-term, liquified, and dominated by a reluctant banking system." It has long been a
regret of ours that we so felt ourselves to be Cassandras, thoroughly ignored by the
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4) In October 1979, the nation’s property capital markets became
subject to a new federal bankruptcy statute. This law motivated
lenders to require the use of remote single-purpose borrowers so
as to insulate themselves from bankruptcies (and the resultant
"cram downs") that would result when real estate or corporate
borrowers had difficulty with other assets or businesses. Addi-
tionally, creditworthy corporate borrowers were further moti-
vated to accept the use of abundant nonrecourse debt as an
effective and ethical stop-loss in the holding of real estate assets.
Indeed, the use of such nonrecourse debt by otherwise well
sponsored, single-purpose entities became a major stimulus to
the speculative fever that gripped real estate market prices in the
mid 1980s.
The authors observe that "it seems clear that ERTA should have
been a powerful stimulus to individual real estate investment .... "
Indeed it was, but what the authors missed is that it was an even more
powerful incentive to corporations to invest in real property. ERTA
offered the ultimate in "transportability" or salability of losses. Losses
could themselves be magnified beyond the use of straight-line depreci-
ation by the use of nonrecourse (stop-loss) leverage, which itself was
turbocharged by deductibility of accrued but unpaid interest and origi-
nal-issue discounts on borrowings. ERTA in effect became the Reaganite
supply-siders’ primary means of doing away with the corporate income
tax. To see that this was possible, one need only view the real estate and
equipment leasing activities of General Electric Corporation during that
period.
Given the dimension of the subsidies, it has long been a wonder to
this writer that more large public companies did not act as aggressively
in this regard. Nonetheless, much of the real estate investment that the
authors attribute to individuals (by their presumption that individuals
are the partners of the numerous partnerships, and owners of the many
single-purpose remote entities that they discover) is misattributed.
Similarly, the assumption of Hines2 on the intent to "churn" may be
misguided. This writer’s experience at the time was that the intent of
syndicators was to hold, but realism required the acknowledgment that
after liquidating a depreciated asset to discharge standing accumulating
debts, there was unlikely to be enough cash to pay any taxes. Therefore,
syndicators usually chose straight-line depreciation so as not to force the
share buyer into the grim realization that death alone (and the subse-
quent "step-up" in basis) was the only escape from an intolerably high
contingent liability.
2 Cited in Appendix A of the Browne/Case paper.102 Peter C. Aldrich
The "box" that conducts an analysis of a typical tax syndication is
helpful in understanding how the unbundling of real estate rights into
component parts created value during the ERTA regime. Unfortunately,
the analysis is badly flawed by presenting the mortgage lender’s and the
developer’s returns as pre-tax internal rates of return, while comparing
them to the shelter investor’s return, which is an after-tax internal rate
of return. Had the calculations been presented correctly, they would
have highlighted a fascinating aspect of ERTA: the tax shelter investor’s
comparative pre-tax equivalent return would be twice that stated, or 30
percent. Since the only threat (other than tax law revision) to the
realization of that return was premature foreclosure, that 30 percent
pre-tax equivalent yield must be compared favorably to traded corporate
bonds, which at the time were yielding approximately one-third of that
amount. Given the low-risk profile, this yield could also be compared
favorably to tax-exempt industrial revenue bonds (15 percent versus
perhaps 6 percent). These staggering differences in returns show the
degree to which ERTA perversely favored the flow of capital to real
estate, whether it was new construction (as had been intended) or the
existing stock of buildings. That perverse incentive, however, had the
effect of lowering the overall cost of capital to real estate, since that is
truly a measure of the cash cost of the property, which in all instances
in the "box" is lower (11.2 percent ($13m + $116m)) than any of the
pre-tax equivalent returns.
Had the sums been done correctly, and had Browne and Case
looked at the other powerful motivators to investment by corporations,
they would have realized that ERTA made real estate investment into
the equivalent of equipment leasing: both the buyer and the seller,
traditionally adversaries, were now motivated to raise the apparent
price at which a transaction occurred. One cannot understand the
overexpansion of real estate in the 1980s without understanding this
remarkable factor. Knowledgeable institutional buyers found that for a
price, sellers would work with them to overstate the effective transfer
price of an asset by the use of various accruing, discounted, hybrid debt
instruments. The effect was to expand the depreciable base of the asset,
thereby further enhancing the value of the tax component of property.
Appraisers inexorably were drawn into the business, and the "investor’s
approach to valuation" became the sordid professional description of a
lack of professional discipline. When all is said and done, the paper’s
extensive description of the effective changes in the tax code understates
the power of those changes. This does not mean, however, that the
paper gives inadequate emphasis to the importance of ERTA. In fact, it
may overemphasize ERTA because other factors are ignored, particu-
larly the expansion of nonrecourse credit, a discussion of which follows.DISCUSSION 103
Credit Availability
The second part of Browne and Case’s paper deals extensively with
the topic of credit availability. I believe it misses the mark, however.
Footnote 11 should by no means be a footnote. It is the heart of the
argument: banks, for a whole series of reasons that are unexplored,
concentrated their risk in illiquid investment lending backed by nonre-
course assets, and they compounded their error by matching those
long-duration assets with short-term liabilities. In effect, they got a very
bad case of "thrift disease."
It is a shame that the paper did not deal more extensively with
thrifts. Yes, banks did indeed finance more commercial construction.
However, thrifts were an extreme case from which one could learn
much. They recklessly or unwittingly advanced the riskiest funds
(development land equity), making too many projects then appear
safely bankable to their commercial bank brethren. The moral hazard
transgressions of thrifts were more pronounced, more extreme in their
violations, and more illustrative of the stresses that forced otherwise
responsible citizens into monstrously damaging economic crimes. The
thrifts’ lack of a tradition of commercial credit analysis and their
complete (and too often fraudulent) reliance on appraisals would have
highlighted the very real problem of mismatched assets and liabilities.
The inquiry would also have highlighted the overarching problem:
poor public policy. As a nation we experienced poor public policy with
respect to inflation, tax reform, deficit expenditures, and savings, to
name several. These public policies demonstrated the most serious
weaknesses of an archaic national financial system. We were shown in
1974 that we needed reform, and again in 1981 and 1982 markets cried
out for reform. Finally, in 1989 the system threatened collapse. Com-
mercial banks, like thrifts, were and still are archaic intermediaries when
compared with their less constrained, more flexible, modern competi-
tors such as mutual funds, pensions (both defined contribution and
defined benefit), 401(k)s, and even insurers. The real public policy
mistake was our failure to come to grips with the need to remake our
nation’s financial systems to reflect the modern postindustrial economy,
which has integrated with a world financial system with a complex
mosaic of interest and exchange rates. We are still working with a
financial system based on the gold standard and the debt deflation of the
1930s, and indeed if we are not more thoughtful renovators, it will bring
us back to another debt deflation in the 1990s.3
I believe that too little or superficial a reading of those collections of
data on debtholders misled the authors on the importance of partner-
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ships as mortgage obligors. The data contain significantly more rich-
ness. "Some 80 percent of noncorporate assets are in real estate." Yes,
but much of this was a determined shift by worried commercial bankers
toward secured lending to their existing business customers, who were
becoming less creditworthy. Bankers were rational. Bankers knew they
were losing their prime credit franchises to the commercial paper market
and to Wall Street generally. Bankers traded down in credit market
sectors, hoping to survive. They were at a competitive disadvantage,
and so took more risk to pay the inflation-swollen costs of money that
were more easily borne by their leaner and more flexible competitors,
who were not mismatched in assets and liabilities. A mutual fund
investor bore the bond losses of an increase in interest rates. The thrift
was unable, and most banks were only imperfectly able, to do so.
I find the authors’ remarks relative to the paucity of standardized
information on noncorporate businesses unconvincing; they miss the
point. Bankers knew what they were doing and to whom they were
lending. Their desire to survive caused them to attempt, through asset
security in an inflationary time, to improve the acknowledged higher-
risk (and return) lending practices forced on them by their comparative
disadvantages.
As mentioned earlier, footnote 11 should not be a footnote. The
paper would be enhanced if it understood the centrality of the changes
in the real estate capital markets brought about by inflation and
deregulation: the true distinction between debt and equity disappeared.
Indeed, the distinctions between borrower and lender in commercial
property began to blur. Debt is debt because of tax law and the
deductibility of interest. Otherwise, nonrecourse debt, the rule in
commercial property finance, would be idiotic and would be replaced by
various preferential equities. If that were the case, then the true risk
levels and durations of such "’bank-loan assets" would have been
apparent. Concentrated high-risk, long-duration, illiquid property in-
vesting by banks, disguised as conventional lending, was a dangerous
tactic openly and often sensibly employed by highly constrained bank-
ers who, in their own words, faced all the perverse "hedge fund"
incentives to take inordinate risk at the expense of the ultimate guaran-
tor (the U.S. government). It is no wonder that so many of the most
constrained and least well supervised (the worst of the thrifts) suc-
cumbed to a pernicious moral hazard.
Had more attention been given to the flow of funds, I believe that
the authors would have been drawn to the inescapable conclusion that
bank lending problems were exacerbated by the erosion of previously
traditional distinctions between the kinds of real estate lending and the
risks that they implied, particularly construction lending versus take-out
lending. Under the old rules, a commercial bank did not lend into a
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permits, but also a fully designed building that was predominantly
leased and financed with a binding commitment at a fixed interest rate.
In other words, if the developer were successful in accomplishing the
construction, without doubt the building would be an economic success
that the developer/owner could afford to hold. This practice was
gradually abandoned during the late 1970s and the 1980s. Unfortu-
nately, bankers did not learn the disciplined underwriting standards
required for permanent take-out lenders, even though they extended
that capital. Thrift lenders did not learn the detailed underwriting
standards of land development lenders, even though they replaced that
capital, and neither bank nor thrift understood sufficiently the difference
between margin lending to the price-anticipating speculator and long-
term real estate investment. The failure to see this disappearance of the
discipline in a highly structured and segmented real estate financial
market was also a failure to see the fragility of a highly constrained
financial system.
Conventional and bank accounting did not help. Real estate lending
was a "wild West" of accounting abuse. Lenders, based on the flimsiest
of appraisals, were able to advance funds to thinly capitalized, single-
purpose remote entities, to be paid back to the institution as swollen
fees, points, and accumulated interest. The practice was aided by ERTA
and became an abusive pre-recognition of very uncertain but hoped-for
capital gains. When generally accepted accounting clearly lies and
distorts, true fraud is not far behind. (One should not assume that the
nation’s insurance industry’s surplus accounting is scot-free of similar
abuses.)
The paper, I believe, places too much blame on one piece of bad
public policy (ERTA) among many. This hides a dangerous, real, and
continuing public policy shortcoming: the lack of major renovation of
our insurance industry and our depository and savings collection
industries.
The Appeal of Real Estate
Browne and Case deal with changed perceptions of property under
the title "The Appeal of Real Estate." Their argument is correct, and the
paper would be much enhanced by an exploration of the competition
that bankers seeking more security and higher returns (the very low-
risk, high-yield argument of the authors) faced from foreign investors,
corporate tax avoiders, and domestic pension funds and life insurers.
Without regard to the tax deductibility of interest, if one acknowledges
that much mortgage debt in the market of the 1980s was really equity in
disguise, then a far more interesting picture confronts the analyst of the
real estate funds flows of that decade. The Poterba model appears to
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very real problem that large sources of funds may be seriously con-
strained from seeking competitive investment alternatives in other
sectors. The paper would be much improved by a more detailed
description of funds flows. The flow of funds data are readily available,
and when combined with an analysis of the effects of ERTA, paint a
compelling picture of the desperate scramble by increasingly disadvan-
taged thrifts, bankers, and life insurers for higher yields to make up for
their competitive disadvantages. An analysis of those recent entrants to
the property capital markets would help explain one of the great
anomalies of the 1980s real estate price structure: the competitiveness of
foreigners and tax-exempt buyers.
Had the true pre-tax equivalent returns of tax shelter investors been
represented correctly in the analysis of the typical syndication, this
question would have arisen again. The tremendous expansion of invest-
ment by the Japanese and Western Europeans, and the accumulation of
the $120 billion of pension equity and property, were done at a
significant competitive disadvantage to tax-subsidized syndicators and
corporations. I believe the explanation of this anomaly lies partially with
ERTA and the perverse "equipmentqeasing pricing" applied to prop-
erty, but also with a phenomenon unexplored by the paper: the entry of
the "collector."
The paper never truly addresses the issue of why the supply-
demand relationship was so thoroughly ignored by the market. The
answer lies in the unlinking of property value from its utility, by the
pressures brought on by long-term investors seeking an effective hedge
against inflation. These were in many respects the same pressures that
led the collector to purchase art and run that market up to unimagined
highs. Property began to be produced for the demand of investors, not
for the demand of users.4 Had the authors further investigated their
curiosity as to the insensitivity of office building construction rates to
interest rates, they undoubtedly would have come upon the importance
of the dramatic shifting down of equity rates of capitalization caused by
the buying appetite of these new participants in the market. This
realization also would, I beli6ve, have caused them to look at the
mechanism for shifting a nearly vertical and inelastic property supply
4 This linkage is very effectively established in a paper entitled "Equilibrium and
Commercial Real Estate Markets: Linking Space and Capital Markets," by Jeffrey Fisher,
Susan Hudson-Wilson, and Charles Wurtzebach, produced by Indiana University (1991)
and scheduled for publication in the Journal of Portfolio Management next year. The National
Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries NACREIF), and the Homer Hoyt Institute
supported this research.DISCUSSION 107
curve in the short run to a much more gently sloped, long-term supply
curve. 5
Sorting Out the Causes of Overbuilding
As mentioned above, I am unconvinced by the Poterba analysis
because it provides little useful, practical information. In effect the
analysis in this section of the paper does little more to explain the nature
of the oversupply of commercial property than the commonly voiced
assertion that growth in the number of lawyers alone accounted for all
the overbuilding of office space.
Commercial Construction Cycles
This is by far the best portion of the paper; here the authors begin
to make a real contribution to the thinking about the nature of the
nation’s real estate capital markets and its construction cycles. The
application of the hog cycle (Figure 4) is an insight that I hope the
authors will develop further, while carefully noting the work done by
Fisher, Hudson-Wilson, and Wurtzebach (1991) referred to above. That
thoughtfully derived article begins with the presumption that the
supply curve is vertical in the short run and then uses the changes in the
supply curve brought about by the marginal pricing of rents to link the
construction cycle with the real estate capital market pricing cycle. The
most convincing work of Browne and Case in the area of construction
cycle lags could be well linked with the other team’s research. The
Browne/Case paper is particularly helpful in describing the mechanisms
by which the lag asserts itself.
The section on leasing, subleasing, and lease negotiations not only
is correct, but also is one that all participants in the real estate capital
markets would be well advised to study to the point of mastery. Indeed,
if one looks at the performance of some of the most spectacularly
flamboyant markets (Houston, for instance), one sees that the tenant
frustration with the contractual inability to sublease at higher rents led
to a fascinating hyper-stimulation of the market through the overcom-
mitment to space by users who chose to become speculators. That
overcommitment to new premises made sublease space in Houston the
largest single component of the market. Marginal pricing of course
crashed, and caused unprecedented declines in that market in the late
1980s.
s The Aldrich/Kopcke article of 1984 deals in considerable detail with this phenome-
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In effect the nation’s real estate capital markets and indeed general
financial markets became intoxicated with real estate in the 1980s. The
authors do not explain convincingly why the patient turned to drink,
but they do explain very convincingly why the besotted became so
terribly, terribly, terribly drunk. Again, from my vantage point, the
reason why the patient turned to drink is a challenging question whose
answer lies in the inability of an archaic and fragile financial system to
cope with a dramatically changed global economy.
Extent and Incidence of the Problem
The next section adds to the significant contributions of the previ-
ous one and provides a good teaching commentary on how declines can
and do occur in real estate. The BrowneJCase paper is very convincing
on the subject of the many forms of hidden leverage that are embedded
in real estate investing. A deeper inquiry in this area would allow the
authors to answer a most challenging current question: why are the
losses on institutional portfolios that are not subject to mortgage debt
often as deep as those experienced by leveraged portfolios? Two
answers are obvious. One is that the purchaser of a free and clear asset
in the 1980s did not understand the degree to which "operating
leverage" was embedded in the acquisition. The paper nicely demon-
strates this problem in Table 7, in which it sets forth the sensitivity of
real estate values to rent levels, vacancy rates, and cap rates; one should
note that the assets in Table 7 are not leveraged. The work is even more
effective when extended to examples in the immediate Boston area,
demonstrating how a debt deflation in this large asset class can be a
serious depressant to a regional economy.
Still another intriguing answer to the dilemma sheds considerable
light on the importance to this whole dynamic of the nonrecourse
lending contract and the confusion of debt and equity. Portfolio holders
of leveraged properties were able to utilize the "stop-loss" characteristic
of nonrecourse debt. The more highly leveraged were their assets, the
more effective was the stop-loss. This asymmetry of the nonrecourse,
highly leveraged investor (heads I win big, tails you lose big) not only
sheds light on the aforementioned dilemma, but also adds interesting
perspective to those who would seek public policy responses to this
extreme cyclicality. (Browne and Case quite correctly point out that
growth markets suffer more than others because their very growth is
itself one of their own biggest industries. Research in this area could be
enhanced by studying some of the more notable examples, such as
Houston, Phoenix, Denver, or Miami, and the experiences encountered
there. The paper’s discussion of Boston is one illustration of this. It
would have been a nice touch if the office building economics of Table 7DISCUSSION 109
and Table 8 had been linked again by calculation to the performance of
the syndicate described in the box.)
Conclusion
This discussant’s conclusion is that the meat of the Browne/Case
paper resides in its work on commercial construction cycles. These very
useful concepts should be the subject of further research and writing by
the authors. The lessons that are set forth therein (the effect of marginal
pricing, the shift of the vertical supply curve toward the horizontal with
a long and predictable lag, and the sources of embedded leverage in an
investment class dominated by tangible assets) are .lessons that must be
learned both by participants in the market and policy planners.
I would point out, however, my very strong disagreement with a
conclusion that states, "But once the boom starts to unwind, it does so
with surprising speed.’" As a practitioner and an observer of market
aggregates, I find that this is just not so. I am constantly surprised at
how sluggish and viscous the movement is in this market. (And this is
central to the authors’ thesis on the lag in the appreciation and
accumulation phase of the market.) The authors have it wrong; the
response is unbelievably slow, but unbelievably deep. They correctly
describe a cascade effect that works only over years: "Rents fall, values
fall even more, lenders suffer losses and become increasingly cautious.
As potential buyers are unable to obtain financing, property values fall
even more. And lenders’ efforts to bolster earnings by cutting costs
further increase the surplus .... "Not only does this cascade effect take
years, but it also takes enough time to allow the institutional market to
institutionalize the forecasted trend. What threatens to occur is a debt
deflation in this asset class, of intolerable proportions. The decline is still
going on today, and this is where policy planners must direct their
attention if our financial systems are to survive long enough to be
thoughtfully renovated.
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David Shulman*
I read with great interest Lynn Browne and Karl Case’s version of
the role the 1980s real estate bubble played in undoing the banks. I agree
with most of the paper’s premises and conclusions, as far as they go. In
particular they rightly argue that, as with most booms, the initial
fundamentals for commercial real estate in the late 1970s were extraor~
dinarily good. Vacancy rates were low, tenant demand was soaring, and
the United States was in the midst of its biggest inflation since the Civil
War, a factor that embedded a premium into the prices of inflation-
sensitive assets. Along with that, the notion of real estate as an asset
class for pension funds was attracting a cadre of sycophants in aca-
demia. Little did the academics realize that the minute period of history
(1972-82) for which consistent data were available represented perhaps
the best real estate market in modern history.
Nevertheless, in my opinion Browne and Case’s analysis, as good
as it is, is incomplete. True, the combination of the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) and the Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 1980 certainly put the nascent boom into
overdrive by marrying the newly deregulated savings and loan associ-
ation with the tax-oriented syndicator. (Needless to say, this marriage
was not made in heaven.) The problem I have with their analysis is that
domestic policy was not the primary culprit. That explanation does not
hold water when one looks at the global aspects of the 1980s real estate
boom. Under far different regulatory and tax regimes, London, Paris,
Tokyo, and Sydney all had real estate booms and busts in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. So to my mind, a more global hypothesis has to be
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considered. Further, if tax policy were the culprit, it is difficult to
reconcile the continuation of the boom well after the adoption of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, which represented a 180-degree turnabout in policy.
Using long lags as an explanation is not good enough, because apart-
ment construction did collapse after the passage of the 1986 Act, but
commercial construction did not.
My own explanation for the post-1986 boom has more to do with
international economic policy (Shulman 1989, 1990, and 1991). On a
weekend in late September 1985, the G-7 finance ministers met in a hotel
in New York City and agreed to a coordinated devaluation of the UoS.
dollar. In order to accomplish this, the Plaza Accord required a global
surge in liquidity to offset the impact of the falling dollar outside the
United States. This process gave rise to what Bank of Japan President
Yasushi Mieno characterized as "asset price inflation" and later "the
bubble economy." In the United States, the Plaza Accord liquidity found
its way into the stock and real estate markets. For example, from the first
quarter of 1979 to the third quarter of 1985, commercial real estate loans
held by commercial banks increased from $78 billion to $195 billion, or
about $4.5 billion a quarter. After the Plaza Accord, from the third
quarter of 1985 to the second quarter of 1991, commercial real estate
loans increased from $195 billion to $377 billion, or about $7 billion a
quarter. During approximately the same time period (1985-91), real
estate lending by foreign branches in the United States increased
sevenfold to about $50 billion. Thus bank deregulation and ERTA do
not, in and of themselves, come close to explaining the lending frenzy
into real estate.
My second concern is that I believe the authors minimize the role of
demand. According to Salomon Brothers’ narrow definition of office
employment, the year-to-year growth in office employment troughed at
20,000 jobs in October 1982 (Figure 1). By March 1984 growth surged to
888,000 jobs, well above the gains of 600,000 jobs reported in early 1980.
Thereafter, while construction continued at extraordinarily high levels,
office employment gains trended lower, to 700,000 jobs by October 1987
and just under 600,000 jobs by April 1989. Then, with the onset of the
"white-collar" recession in June 1990, the growth in office jobs dropped
to 400,000. By July 1991 the level of office employment had declined
nearly 300,000 jobs from the previous year, an unprecedented drop
(Shulman and Hopkins 1990). In my opinion it was this demand collapse
that represented the final nail in real estate’s coffin.
My explanation for part of the demand collapse has to do with what
I have called a "’Say’s Law effect" in real estate. Simply put, supply
creates its own demand, because a real estate boom in and of itself
increases the demand for office workers in law, accounting, finance, title
insurance, lease brokering, and architecture. Once the boom stops,112 David Shulman
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however, the demand for these workers unwinds, with a concomitant
rise in vacancy rates.
Third, what happened in the United States in the 1980s was the
creation of unique suburban activity centers characterized by Garreau
(1991) as "edge cities.’" These centers offered tenants a multiple choice of
office location options within a given metropolitan area, and this had the
effect of devaluing the entire concept of location. So when the crash
finally came, the notion of real estate as collateral had lost some of its
meaning (Shulman 1989).
Lastly, on a macroeconomic level, the disinflation of the 1980s
gradually wrung out the inflation premium that was put into real estate
asset prices during the 1978-82 period. Because of the mania, investors
and lenders alike failed to take note that real office rents had been falling
since 1982 (Shulman and Byrne 1991). Once the recognition lag was
overcome, however, the pricing effects were brutal, because they had to
overcome several years of falling rents along with the removal of the
inflation premium.DISCUSSION 113
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